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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1980s, there was great optimism about the prospects for a
dawning era of toxic harms litigation, arising out of a heightened sensitivity
to public health and safety concerns. This new sensitivity had been
manifested in the preceding decade through a whirlwind of political activity,
highlighted by such landmark Congressional legislation as the Clean Air
Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, and by the establishment of the Environmental Protection
Agency.' Along parallel lines, a singularly proactive judicial framework for
strict products liability emerged in the mid-1960s from a series of California
Supreme Court cases and the promulgation of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 402A.2 To some, the stage seemed set for ushering in a new
era.
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. My appreciation to Joelle
Emerson and Stephanie Kantor for research assistance.
1. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189,
1278-95 (1986).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE
LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 140-49
(2008).
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In this brief overview, I will begin by highlighting some of the key early
developments in the toxic tort domain and the contemporaneous critical
literature in the 1980s. 3 In particular, I will focus on the singular types of
claims that were pursued-such as emotional distress (cancerphobia),
probabilistic recovery for future harm, and medical monitoring-and the
contemporaneous efforts to aggregate claims by reference to class actions. I
will then offer some thoughts on the mixed success realized in the ensuing
years, focusing on the limitations imposed on the new types of claims by the
institutional structure of tort law, but at the same time noting the expansive
themes in more traditional types of claims-such as duty to warn-as well as in
aggregation strategies of a less formal character.4 In concluding, I will briefly
address the question of comparative institutional competence: Do more
conventional regulatory strategies for controlling risks associated with toxic
exposures offer greater promise as policy options?'
II. 1980s: OUTSIZED EXPECTATIONS?
As the magnitude of the public health effects generated by asbestos
exposure became evident, the courts struggled to keep pace with the claims
for victim compensation. As early as 1973, a widely-noted decision by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming an asbestos plaintiff's award, Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,6 relied on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 402A as a touchstone to define a manufacturer's responsibility
to warn about product risks in very expansive terms.7 To the Borel court, a
product manufacturer was to be held "to the knowledge and skill of an
expert." 8 The manufacturer's duty was to test, inspect, and keep current-to
research and experiment "commensurate with the dangers involved."9
Borel cannot, in itself, explain the quantum leap in asbestos filings that
occurred in the succeeding decade: during the 1980s, filings in federal courts
alone rose from fewer than 1,000 in the entire decade of the 1970s to 10,000
between 1980 and 1984.'o But the case undoubtedly contributed to a shift in
tactics on the part of asbestos manufacturers from stonewalling to settling
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part V.
5. See infra Part VI.
6. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
7. Id. at 1087.
8. Id. at 1089.
9. Id. at 1090.
10. See Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The Consequences ofAsbestos Litigation, 26 REV.
LITIG. 583, 589 (2007). The early 1980s typically saw about 5,000 claims per year. See STEPHEN J.
CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 72 (2005), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
the annual rate of new claims grew to roughly 25,000 claims per year. Id.
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claims as they arose."
In another landmark of the period, the widely-publicized claims of
Vietnam War veterans for compensation from exposure to Agent Orange
were being litigated in an Eastern District of New York courtroom before
Judge Jack Weinstein.' 2 Despite the enormous variety of exposures and
disease claims brought by the many thousands of claimants, Judge
Weinstein approved-indeed instigated-a class settlement. 3 In his opinion
supporting the settlement, the judge resorted to bold language, suggesting
that statistical evidence of risk based on epidemiological studies would
suffice to support proportionate damage awards to individual members of
the class-further encouraging the emerging toxics tort plaintiffs bar to think
that a new era was dawning.14
On the doctrinal side, Borel soon appeared to be an opening salvo in the
continuing impulse to expand products liability law along new frontiers. In
the landmark case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,s the much-publicized
claims arising out of the miscarriage preventative DES-ingested by
pregnant mothers whose grown daughters now had contracted cervical
cancer-came before the California Supreme Court. DES posed a causation
dilemma triggered by the long passage of time from ingestion to disease and
the inability to distinguish among pills produced by a large number of drug
companies. The court addressed the dilemma in a forthright fashion,
adopting a novel market share approach to liability that constituted a
singular departure from the traditional but-for test of causal responsibility.
At roughly the same time, the New Jersey Supreme Court articulated its
understanding of the implications of strict products liability for failure to
warn litigation in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,'7 in which it
took the position that the defendant asbestos manufacturer could be held
responsible for failure to warn of risks associated with the product even if it
had no knowledge of those risks at time of distribution.' 8  The question
posed by the new strict liability regime, according to the court, was whether
ex post the product was in fact defective-not whether the manufacturer
11. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 211
(1985).
12. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 818 F.2d
145 (2d Cir. 1987).
13. See id at 862. For a case study of the Agent Orange litigation, see PETER H. SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS ToxiC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (enlarged ed. 1987).
14. In re "Agent Orange", 597 F. Supp. at 838, 842.
15. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
16. Id. at 937-38.
17. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
18. See id at 546.
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knew or should have known of the risks ex ante.19
These leading instances of the tenor of the times, as proactive courts-
particularly the California and New Jersey Supreme Courts-worked out the
implications of enterprise liability for product defects, animated a critical
literature proposing still more striking departures from the traditional
boundaries of interpersonal responsibility in tort. 20  In this vein, Glen
Robinson argued that, "[a]s long as liability is proportionate to the risks
created by a defendant, there is no reason why the Sindell liability rule cannot
,,21
be applied to cases involving multiple and different risk-creating activities.
He posited a victim who has contracted cancer and three events that
contributed to the risk of his developing cancer: the victim worked as an
asbestos installer for twenty years; then he worked ten years at a chemical
plant where he was exposed to chemical wastes; and, correspondingly, he took
medication that created a risk of cancer. Robinson suggested that if the
estimates of these three contributions to cancer were 60/20/20, each
contributor might be held liable according to those percentages under a modest
extension of Sindell.
In a similar vein, Richard Delgado proposed an extension of liability
from "indeterminate defendants," as in Sindell, to "indeterminate
plaintiffs"-recognizing recovery for plaintiffs exposed to a variety of toxics
culminating in a single disease condition.22
And on a grander scale, David Rosenberg, in a much-noted article,
spelled out a "public law" version of tort for mass toxics and products cases:
envisioning a radically restructured approach that would have relied on class
action treatment of mass toxic tort claims, probabilistic determination of
causation, proportionate allocation of liability among defendants, supervised
funding of scheduled damages, and other restructuring strategies, aimed at
breaking the mold (and overcoming the systemic limits) of traditional bi-
party tort processes.23
As might be expected, there were voices of dissent, sharply questioning
the institutional competence of courts (and juries, in particular) to regulate
industry through "public law litigation." In a sharply-leveled attack on
Rosenberg's public law vision of tort, Peter Huber forcefully asserted the
incapacity of juries both to understand the complexities of, and to overcome
19. Id. Beshada ignited a firestorm of criticism and was soon limited to its facts. See Feldman v.
Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 384 (N.J. 1984).
20. The judicial conception of enterprise liability in fact had its roots in the much earlier
concurring opinion of Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal.
1944).
21. Glen Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L.
REV. 713, 750 (1982) (emphasis in original).
22. Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate
Plaintifs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982).
23. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision ofthe Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984).
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inherent biases against, new and complex technologies for addressing what
he termed "public risks."24
Moreover, no matter how encouraging the signals sent by asbestos,
Agent Orange, and other mass tort cases like Dalkon Shield (the failed
intrauterine device that sent A.H. Robins into bankruptcy),25 there were
notable litigation failures in the courthouse as well, such as the Bendectin
litigation involving an anti-nausea pregnancy drug allegedly associated with
infant birth defects.26
Nonetheless, withering attacks on the tort system, such as Huber's, did
little to dim the enthusiasm of a plaintiffs' bar committed to a proactive
stance in expanding the boundaries of liability for toxic harms. In singular
fashion, toxic tort claims probed the boundaries of the duty/breach/
causation/damages framework of liability rules and the corresponding
process limitations on aggregation of tort claims.
III. TAKING STOCK: WHAT ARE THE SINGULAR TYPES OF CLAIMS THAT
HAVE ARISEN?
As the asbestos litigation matured, a distinct pattern of claims began to
emerge-entirely apart from more straightforward actions for the physical
disabilities associated with asbestosis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma.
Plaintiffs sued for the emotional distress associated with the fear of
contracting cancer from exposure to asbestos-so-called cancerphobia
claims. 27  These exposure-generated claims, in turn, spilled over to a wide
variety of other toxic exposures in which the victim sought damages for the
anguish of anticipating (and living with) the prospect of a long-latency
disease coming to fruition.28 A leading example is toxic exposure through
24. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards ofPublic Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1985). But see Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts,
andAgencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (1990) (responding directly to the Huber critique).
25. For discussion of the Dalkon Shield cases, see Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson,
Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961
(1993).
26. For discussion of the Bendectin litigation, see MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH
DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996). The scorecard on
mass toxic tort cases in this early period is well-described in Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady
Sung? The Future ofMass Toxic Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 883, 894-904 (2007) [hereinafter, Hensler,
Has the Fat Lady Sung?].
27. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) (a widely-noted FELA
case). Negligent infliction of emotional distress claims had already been recognized, but only for the
narrow scenario of "near-miss" (fright) cases. See, e.g., Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965).
28. In fact, these claims were not limited exclusively to toxic substance exposures. See Hensler
& Peterson, supra note 25, at 989-98.
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drinking water in cases like Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. ,29 where
defendant's dumping of toxic wastes into a landfill near its plant allegedly
exposed plaintiffs to carcinogens over an extended period of time.
A related set of claims, again most closely associated with the asbestos
litigation, involved probabilistic claims for future harm-a concrete instance
of claims for probabilistic recovery postulated in the scholarship referred to
above.30  In the context of asbestos claims, these actions arose quite
naturally: asbestosis, a lung-scarring disease closely associated with
exposure to asbestos, is sometimes a pathway to contraction of lung cancer;
hence, victims of the former brought probabilistic claims for present
recovery in anticipation of the enhanced prospect of developing lung cancer
later.3 '
It follows virtually inexorably from these related theories of recovery,
centering on the prospect of serious future harm, that a corresponding set of
claims would arise seeking early warning-in particular, claims for medical
monitoring. Once again, many of the early cases involved asbestos
exposure-but by no means all. Claims for medical monitoring ran the
gamut; here, too, toxic intrusions into drinking water systems served as a
particularly fertile field.32
Apart from substantive theories, plaintiffs attempted to build on the
early success in Agent Orange, and creative judicial efforts in asbestos, to
aggregate claims either formally under class action provisions such as Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in clusters as consolidated
claims.33 Class action treatment of tort claims was not exclusively
associated with the new mass toxics litigation; in a more traditional vein, it
had served as a vehicle for aggregating claims in commercial aircraft crashes
and large-scale fires or structural collapses.34 But the novelty of mass toxic
claims was the diversity of injuries and exposures-a far cry from the
29. 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
30. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 23.
31. These claims were for latent possibility of physical injury rather than emotional distress over
the prospect of such injury, although the two causes of action were often brought in tandem.
32. See, e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (asbestos exposure); In re
Paoili R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991)
(ingestion of toxic chemicals).
33. For a discussion of creative judicial management techniques, see Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond
Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 475 (1991). For an example of such techniques, see Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F.
Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990). Judge Parker's multi-phase class action certification in Cimino was
subsequently reversed by the Fifth Circuit. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir.
1998). For a discussion of Cimino, see JEAN MACCHIAROLI EGGEN, TOXIC TORTS: IN A NUTSHELL
425-28 (4th ed. 2010). Consider also informal means of dispute resolution resorted to at the time:
claims facilities. See Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The Unattended Consequences of
Asbestos Litigation, 26 REV. LITIG. 583, 598-605 (2008).
34. See Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung?, supra note 26, at 895; see generally JAMES S.
KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION
ACCIDENT LITIGATION (1988), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2007/R342l.pdf.
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relatively straightforward tragedy of mass deaths in a plane crash.
What was singular about these claims? Not the mass-disaster character
itself; as just mentioned, victims had sought mass tort recovery in other
settings on earlier occasions. But the harms suffered in these earlier
instances of mass tragedy involved relatively straightforward assessment of
damages: most often, both the identification and the quantum of recoverable
damages was uncontestable. Bodies were there for the counting; causal
uncertainty, if it existed at all, was not enshrouded in scientific uncertainty.
The leitmotif of the harm was immediate disabling death or injury. By
contrast, the paradigmatic mass toxics case was characterized by long
latency between exposure and manifestation of disease, generating claims
that posed causal uncertainty and unease about unleashing a flood of
litigation.
IV. SCORECARD ON SUCCESS
If the early 1980s appeared in some quarters to be the launching pad of a
new era of expansive responsibility in tort, a more grounded reality soon set
in. While the tort system proved to be accommodating to enlarging the
boundaries of claims that fit within the products liability makeover of the
mid-1960s-a robust responsibility for duty to wam and a recognition of
design defect claims-there was a chillier reception to recasting tort to
address long latency, scientific uncertainty, and mass harm in the toxics
arena. 35
Thus, the newly recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress
tort (NIED) remained within the restricted parameters of "near miss"
scenarios; that is, claims by those within the zone of danger of physical
harm.36 Of course, a more creative reading of "zone of danger" might very
well have extended recovery to the victim of a toxic exposure living in fear
of cancer. Indeed, a respectable argument can be made that it is perverse to
recognize the tort claim of an individual traumatized by almost being hit by
a negligent driver (a fleeting moment of terror?), but to deny recovery to an
individual living with a long-term prospect of contracting cancer due to a
defendant's wrongful conduct.
This diversity of treatment of NIED claims has floodgates written all
35. I proceed with a thumbnail sketch of developments rather than a full-scale treatment of the
topic.
36. See Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965) (discussing the history and evolution of the
near miss doctrine); see also Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of
Constraint, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1197, 1200 (2009).
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over it.37 While near-miss victims might, in theory, line up in large numbers
claiming actionable trauma, the reality is that these claims would almost
invariably be regarded as de minimis-and hence never see the light of day.
By contrast, liability for a heightened long-term risk of cancer from high-
level ingestion or exposure to toxic pollutants could potentially generate
claims en masse that would be extremely difficult to cabin.
Similarly, probabilistic claims for present recovery of prospective future
harm have not fared well. Under the "two disease rule," these cases have
been dispatched, often in tandem with related emotional distress claims. 9
The rule dictates present recovery for any lesser disease condition
attributable to defendant's conduct, but recovery only later for the
"pathway" disease (and attendant emotional distress) when it is manifested.
Again, floodgate concerns play a central role here, particularly evident in the
case of asbestos-related diseases where recourse to this probabilistic claim
fit the etiology of exposure: lung-scarring asbestosis, which was sometimes
the harbinger of later-developing lung cancer.40
But more is at stake than floodgate concerns here. In contrast to
emotional distress claims, efforts at probabilistic present recovery for future
harm are premised on a robust vision of scientific certainty that frequently
rests on an unstable foundation of the existing state of scientific knowledge.
Indeed, it is just this judicial skepticism about the precision of probabilistic
data that has undermined not just the claims for present recovery for future
harm, but the broader theoretical underpinnings for probabilistic recovery.
Advocates of probabilistic recovery have pointed out the paradox in granting
full recovery across-the-board to a class of exposed victims that includes
both the unlucky carriers of baseline population risk along with exposure-
based victims of a defendant's conduct.41  But the courts fall back on the
traditional rough justice of the "more probable than not" burden of proof as a
conservative bastion against the daunting task of a more fine-tuned
probabilistic reliance on the latest risk data available.
The third piece in this triumvirate of freshly-minted toxic claims,
medical monitoring, has played out in a more complicated fashion. Many
states have, in fact, recognized medical monitoring claims-at times,
37. See generally Rabin, supra note 36.
38. This concern is emphasized in Metro-N. Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1999).
39. See Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996); see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 785 n.51 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991) (rejecting claims for
increased fear and risk of disease).
40. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 10, at 13-19 (discussing the increased likelihood of
developing lung cancer after exposure to asbestos).
41. See Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1243-51 (1987) (introducing
the "most likely victim" theory as a means of addressing this paradox); see also Michael D. Green,
The Future of Proportional Liability: The Lessons of Toxic Substances Causation, in EXPLORING
TORT LAW 352, 359-62 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) (discussing various commentators'
perspectives on probabilistic recovery).
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corresponding with the rejection of emotional distress and probabilistic
future harm recovery in the same case.42 Contrary to these related claims,
there is frequently less speculation involved in determining that an exposure
has been sufficient to warrant preventive monitoring than in hypothesizing
that the condition will in fact manifest itself. And there is a pecuniary
anchor, out-of-pocket medical surveillance costs, that dispels some of the
unease over the intangible nature of the emotional distress claim.
Nonetheless, medical monitoring has come to be hedged in with
qualifiers. Some states only recognize the claims in tandem with physical
injuries. 43 Many states are reluctant to allow traditional lump-sum awards,
as contrasted to funded-as-incurred recovery." There has been a dearth of
enthusiasm for recognizing class action recovery.4 5 In short, medical
monitoring has been subjected to restrictions that were not necessarily
anticipated at the outset.
But the full measure of the concerns that diluted the growth of tort
responsibility for toxic harms has been registered on the procedural side-in
particular, in the failure of the class action in the most-widely recognized of
the toxic tort episodes. Here, virtually all of the judicial trepidations about
boundaries converge: mass numbers of cases and choice of law issues signal
caution regarding capacity for judicial management; diverse exposures and
varying disease profiles raise concerns about the traditional protections
afforded individual rights; and long latency poses vexing concerns about the
treatment of futures plaintiffs. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor46 dashed
all hopes for a structured, aggregate resolution of the asbestos controversy,
and Castano v. American Tobacco Co. 47 played a similar role in the tobacco
area.48
42. See, e.g., In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 785 (finding medical monitoring claims cognizable under
Pennsylvania law while at the same time rejecting emotional distress and future harm claims).
43. A recent study reports that at least seventeen states have refused to recognize a medical
monitoring cause of action absent a present physical injury. See D. Scott Aberson, Note, A Fifty-
State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take
When Confronted with the Issue, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1095, 1115-16 (2006) (listing states
that do not recognize medical monitoring claims without a present physical injury).
44. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 825 n.28 (Cal. 1993)
(rejecting lump-sum award in favor of a fund to pay medical monitoring claims as they accrue);
Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting lump-sum verdict,
finding that such a verdict "cannot predict the amounts that actually will be expended for medical
purposes").
45. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 63 P.3d 913 (Cal. 2003).
46. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
47. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
48. See also Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (tobacco case rejecting
state-wide class action); see generally In re Rhone-Poulenc Rhorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.
427
But this is less than the full story. Interestingly, private efforts at
resolution of mass tort episodes have proceeded undeterred. 4 9  Notably,
notwithstanding Amchem, multi-billion dollar settlements have been
negotiated in the Silicone breast implant, fen-phen, and Zyprexa litigation.so
Entirely apart from formal class actions, the judicial forum has lent
encouragement to securing "global peace" through the facilitating
mechanism of multidistrict litigation panel assignments for resolution of
pretrial issues, which has, in turn, served as a medium for encouraging mass
settlements.51
Surveying the mass tort claims phenomenon in a detailed analysis of the
settlement data through 2007, Deborah Hensler concluded that sounding the
death knell on this litigation was misplaced:
Mass toxic tort litigation in the past and now is a mix of cases that
fail to take off as mass torts, cases that are pursued and settled in
aggregate form but for less than mega-amounts, and cases that
impose significant costs on defendant corporations and allow mass
tort plaintiff firms to take sizeable bundles of money to the bank.52
These informal settlement efforts rest, by and large, on the doctrinal
framework of products liability that has emerged since the mid-i 960s, rather
than the less successful efforts, discussed above, to create a new public law
litigation model in the courtroom. Even as the public law vision of toxics
litigation has faltered, traditional tort initiatives-with a decidedly public
impact-have thrived. The duty to warn of potential toxic risks associated
with a product, and related issues of causal connection, frequently lead to
contested outcomes; consider, on that score, the jury verdicts: five for
plaintiffs and eleven for the defendant (with two mistrials) in the Vioxx
litigation prior to mass settlement. But across the board, whether plaintiffs
1995) (particularly influential case rejecting class certification of hemophiliacs infected with HIV
supplied by blood-solids manufacturers).
49. See generally RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SEITLEMENT (2007).
50. See Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung?, supra note 26, at 920.
51. Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical
Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 883, 890-92 (2001) [hereinafter, Hensler, The Role of Multi-
Districting].
52. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung?, supra note 26, at 920. Hensler wrote prior to the novel
(and controversial) informal settlement of the Vioxx litigation. See Howard M. Erichson &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 2011).
53. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Wins Product Liability Case in Florida Circuit
Court (Oct. 5, 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/news-release-archive/corporate
2007_1005.html; see also Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung?, supra note 26, at 919 (as of March
2007). In November 2007, Merck settled all Vioxx U.S. product liability claims, nearly 26,600
lawsuits with 47,000 plaintiff groups, for $4.85 billion. David Voreacos & Jef Feeley, Merck Vioxx
AccordLeadLawyers to Get $315 Million, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Oct. 20, 2010, 11:24 AM EDT),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-20/merck-vioxx-accord-lead-lawyers-to-get-315-
million.html; Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Agreement to Resolve U.S. VIOXX Product
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assert claims from exposure to toxic chemicals or ingestion of defective
drugs, the proactive reframing of duty to warn and design defect in modem,
post-1960s products liability litigation has extended to the sub-category of
toxic tort litigation.
V. Toxic EXPOSURES THROUGH THE PRISM OF TORT: A REPRISE
As a general proposition, the common law of torts has shown
considerable adaptability to changing social circumstances. Consider the
principal "new torts" that emerged in the twentieth century: intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and privacy. In each of these areas, tort law showed considerable
sensitivity--one might say that it served as a social barometer-in
recognizing changing conceptions of personality that warranted legal
protection. Norms of civility, unheard of in earlier times, were recognized
not just as animating informal rules of appropriate interpersonal conduct, but
as establishing legal rights and duties.54
Similarly, in the economic sphere, as a new scale of business enterprise
emerged, in which product manufacture and marketing became national in
scope, corresponding theories of efficient and widespread distribution of risk
emerged. And these theories, grounded in the foundational growth of
insurance markets, crystallized in an enterprise liability perspective on
obligations in tort." Here, as in the newly recognized protections of
personality interests, the flexible, bipolar structure of tort law could
accommodate with relative ease to a new order of commercial relations.
Stress lines began to develop, however, as uncertainty about the
parameters of legal responsibility clouded the picture. Concededly, tort law
does not thrive on uncertainty; but it can cope within bounds. Questions of
defect are pervasive in drug, auto, and medical device litigation: How much
side-effect or product failure risk is there? When should it have been
discovered? And what, if anything, could have been done to eliminate it?
These can be perplexing questions to answer with any degree of confidence,
generating differences of opinion both among outside commentators and
between experts testifying in the courtroom.56 Yet the tort system, despite
Liability Lawsuits (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/news-release-
archive/corporate/2007_1109.html.
54. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1990).
55. Abraham, supra note 2, at 143-49.
56. Compare Huber, supra note 24 (arguing that greater acceptance of public risks "improve the
overall state of our risk environment" and the "judicial system is ... incapable of engaging in the
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the vehement protests of some critics, has not backed off from addressing
these issues-and the impetus for rolling back the primacy of tort has largely
been limited to incremental remedial reforms.57
But when are the boundaries of tolerable uncertainty exceeded? The
toxic substance litigation has posed this question in a variety of ways, as we
have seen. One version of uncertainty is encapsulated in the floodgates
concern: Will there be boundless litigation if recovery is allowed in a given
subcategory of cases? At its core, this is the concern in the NIED
cancerphobia cases. 8 Boundless litigation is, from the judicial perspective,
an attack on the very foundations of tort law: from a judicial administration
vantage point, the capacity to process cases efficiently, and from the parties'
vantage point, a recognition of claims to "just deserts" in the face of
prospectively insolvent responsible parties. Judicial misgivings over
procedural aggregation similarly become apparent when, in tandem,
claimants are too many and claims are too dissimilar.
Another version of uncertainty is bound up in the converging
characteristics of long latency and the limits of scientific information. The
latter, of course, can be the centerpiece of prescription drug side-effect
litigation as well. But the paradigmatic drug case is adjudicated against the
backdrop of regulatory approval through compliance with an established
protocol for submitting risk information. Moreover, in the typical drug or
product defect case, there is no substantially long latency between exposure
to risk and consequent harm, nor is the court being asked to award
probabilistic damages in accordance with risk information. The resistance to
proportional damages recovery, discounted present-value recovery of
possible future harm, and to some extent medical monitoring, should be read
against these reservations about stretching traditional boundaries.
VI. ARE CONVENTIONAL REGULATORY STRATEGIES MORE EFFECTIVE?
The comparative competence of tort and regulation is far too broad a
topic to pursue in this brief essay. But it would be remiss not to mention it
aggregative calculus of risk created and risk averted that progressive public-risk management
require"), and A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Products Liability, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010) (arguing "that the three beneficial effects of product liability-inducing
firms to improve product safety, causing prices of products to reflect their risks, and providing
compensation to injured consumers-are .. . likely to be outweighed by the litigation and related
costs of product liability"), with Gillette & Krier, supra note 24 (directly responding to Huber's
critique), and John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability: A
Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1919 (2010) (directly responding
to Polinsky & Shavell's critique). On judicial efforts to assure the credibility of scientific evidence
in the courtroom, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Discussion of
Daubert and the vast literature and case law it has spawned is beyond the scope of this paper.
57. These state legislative reforms are discussed in Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Offto the
Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 HoUS. L. REV. 207 (1990).
58. See generally Rabin, supra note 36.
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because no policy analysis is complete without, at the very least, recognizing
the need to ask the "as compared to what" question.
Without doubt, there are some public health and safety concerns that are
best approached through regulatory initiatives and where the contribution of
tort to reducing risk has been limited at best. In my view, tobacco control is
a prominent example. Through a combination of reporting health-related
information, prohibiting smoking in workplaces and public
accommodations, and increasing excise taxes, governmental regulation has
greatly reduced tobacco use since the mid-1960s. 59  By contrast, tort
litigation against the tobacco companies has had a long and checkered career
in which the major contributions to reducing smoking-the costs to the
industry of defending the lawsuits and the Master Settlement Agreement
with the states in 1998-appear to have added very little to overall harm
reduction.60
A similar assessment seems likely in the current efforts to address the
public health problem of obesity. The difficulty in establishing a causal link
between obesity and identifiable defendants on a case-by-case basis appears
to be an overwhelming obstacle to accomplishing much on the tort litigation
front, particularly when compared with the array of regulatory possibilities:
educational efforts and food subsidy initiatives (in the schools),
informational requirements (product labeling), excise taxes, and so on.6
This is not to overstate what can be accomplished by government initiatives
in this challenging area, but rather to emphasize the far better prospects of
government regulation than toxic tort litigation.
In other areas, however, regulation has played virtually no role at all in
reducing risk and compensating victims. This is especially evident in the
case of asbestos, where the toxic products remained on the market,
unregulated in any meaningful sense, until the toll of death and disease from
exposure had spiraled entirely out of control. 62
Then, there are still other areas in which tort and regulation have played
a complementary role. Despite recent efforts to preempt state tort suits, in
particular during the Bush Administration, the Supreme Court has for the
most part reaffirmed the principle of complementarity. In the prescription
59. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future
Promise, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1721 (2008).
60. Id. at 1732-50.
61. On the array of strategies to curb childhood obesity, see generally Marlene B. Schwartz &
Kelly D. Brownell, Actions Necessary to Prevent Childhood Obesity: Creating the Climate for
Change, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHics 78 (2007).
62. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 10, at II (discussing the 1989 asbestos ban proposed by the
EPA and put into effect; subsequently, some limited uses were permitted).
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drug area, for example, the Court's recent decision in Wyeth v. Levine6 1
seems destined to preclude tort suits only when they would directly conflict
with the FDA's present findings of compliance.64 Moreover, while
observers might differ in assessing the comparative track records of agency
regulations and tort litigation from a public health perspective, tort
obviously plays a singular role in providing the prospect of compensation
once a drug defect and harm has occurred.
In the final analysis, the case for retaining tort in the toxic substances
area remains strong, as long as one remains cognizant of the limits of
liability law and expectations do not press too sharply against traditional
system boundaries.
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63. 129 S.Ct. 1187(2009).
64. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Territorial Claims in the Domain of Accidental Harm:
Conflicting Conceptions of Tort Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 987 (2009).
